In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore's proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: apparently, there are more ways in heaven and earth that warrant can fail to transmit across valid inference from one (set of) belief(s) to another, than have been dreamt of in philosophy so far. More specifically, Davies thinks that a second kind of transmission failure has to be countenanced. He connects each kind of failure of transmission of warrant with two different kinds of epistemic project, respectively, and with the exploration of whether the current dispute between conservatives such as Wright, and liberals such as Jim Pryor, on the nature of perceptual warrant, would have a bearing on them. I point out why Davies's second kind of transmission failure is indeed no such thing. I then move on to canvass another kind of transmission failure, different from the one studied by both Wright and Davies, and dependent on an alternative conception of the structure of empirical warrants, which I dub "moderatism". I then consider how this alternative notion of transmission failure fares with respect to Moore's proof, its relationship with Wright's kind of transmission failure and with the Closure principle. In closing, I defend it from criticisms that can be elicited from Pryor's recent work.
Introduction
In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore's proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. 1 The briefest rehearsal of this kind of transmission failure will be the subject of §1. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure would be more than enough, Martin Davies has recently challenged this view: apparently, there are more ways in heaven and earth that warrant can fail to transmit across valid inference from one (set of) belief(s) to another, than have been dreamt of in philosophy so far. 2 More specifically, Davies thinks that a second kind of transmission failure has to be countenanced. He connects each kind of failure of transmission of warrant with two different kinds of epistemic project, and with the exploration of whether the current dispute between conservatives, such as Wright, and liberals, such as Jim Pryor, on the nature of perceptual warrant, would have a bearing on them. Leaving these latter issues aside, 3 I wish merely to point out why Davies's second kind of transmission failure is indeed no such thing ( §2). I then move on to canvass another kind of transmission failure, different from the one studied by both Wright and Davies ( §3) and dependent on a conception of the structure of empirical warrants alternative to Wright's and Pryor's, which I dub "moderatism". I investigate its bearing on Moore's proof ( §4) and its relationship with Wright's kind of transmission failure and the Closure principle ( §5). In closing ( §6), I defend it from criticisms that can be elicited from Pryor's recent work. 4 .
Wright's and Davies's original failure
A debate in contemporary epistemology which has been enjoying increasing attention 5 concerns whether Moore's proof of an external world-(I) Here is a hand; (II) If there is a hand here, then there is an external world; Therefore (III) There is an external worldexhibits what Wright first called "failure of transmission of warrant". Wright's idea is that Moore's proof is one of a range of arguments which, while valid and, at least in a normal context, proceeding from warranted premises, are nevertheless powerless 1 Wright (1985 Wright ( , 2000 Wright ( , 2002 Wright ( , 2003 Wright ( , 2004 and Davies (1998 Davies ( , 2000 Davies ( , 2003 Davies ( , 2004 Davies ( , 2008 . 2 Davies (2008) . 3 I discuss them in Coliva (2010) . 4 Pryor (2011) to produce a first warrant (or to enhance one's previous warrant) to believe their conclusions, since prior possession of warrant for the latter is needed for possession of warrant for (at least one of) their premises in the first place. The phenomenon is often illustrated by means of the following example: 6 (I) Here is a zebra; (II) If this is a zebra, then it isn't a cleverly disguised mule; Therefore (III) This isn't a cleverly disguised mule The idea is that normal perceptual experience as of a zebra in front of one can provide a warrant for (I) only if one is already warranted in supposing (III)-that one is not in fact perceptually interacting with a cleverly disguised mule or, more generally, in any other way dealing with an environment in which visual appearances are grossly misleading. Thus, if one possesses a perceptual warrant for (I)-as normal on going to a zoo and seeing what looks like a zebra in a pen, one will also, as required by Closure of warrant across entailment (which Wright doesn't question), possess a warrant for (III). Still, on Wright's view, one can't acquire a first warrant to believe (III) (or add to one's pre-existing reasons to believe it) by running such an argument. For, to repeat, one's perceptual warrant for (I) depends not just on the content of one's current sensory experience-which could be indistinguishable, at least in principle, even if one were indeed interacting with a cleverly disguised mule-but also on the collateral information that, among other things, one is not suffering any form of gross deception, in particular not perceiving a cleverly disguised mule. That information, in turn, is rationally accepted just in case one has some form of independent warrant for it. Hence, antecedent warrant for (III) is needed, on Wright's view, in order for one's sense experience to provide an (albeit defeasible) warrant for (I). 7 If so, however, the argument is epistemically circular (or question-begging) and can't, therefore, produce a first (or enhance one's previous) warrant to believe its conclusion. 8 Let me point out that this argument draws merely on the following conceptual resource: it takes theory to infer from a phenomenon, such as a perceptual experience, to its likely 9 causes. For its content is compatible, at least in principle, with its being produced in many different ways-dreams, holograms, appropriate stimulations of one's brain, etc. That's all that is needed to set the argument into motion. That is to say, to motivate the thought that more is required than just one's current sense experience, in order to have (a defeasible) perceptual warrant for ordinary empirical beliefs 6 Made famous by Dretske (1970 Dretske ( , p. 1016 as a putative counterexample to the principle of Closure of knowledge across (known) entailment. 7 It is important to keep in mind that the experience as of a zebra together with the information that it isn't a cleverly disguised mule isn't enough to give one an indefeasible warrant for (I): it could still be a cleverly disguised pony, for instance. 8 It is important to stress that the kinds of warrant at issue for Wright (and Pryor) are propositional ones. There will be more about this topic in the following section. 9 See footnote 7. In general, then, warrant for the conclusion of the argument is needed to take one's current sense experience to bear on a class of possible beliefs. As will become apparent in the case of Moore's proof, warrant for the existence of an external world will be needed in order for one's experience as of a hand to bear on a belief about a material object, whether or not the former is actually caused by the interaction with a hand, rather than with any other material object which somehow resembles a hand. such as (I). That it might seem otherwise, given the phenomenology of our usual ways of forming warranted beliefs about ordinary physical objects in our surroundings, is a mere by-product of the fact that the actual architecture of perceptual warrant remains most of the times implicit. Of course, to say this is not yet to side with Wright. For it may still be disputed, in various ways, as we shall see ( § §2-3) , that the structure of warrants is as he thinks of it.
For a long time Davies has shared both Wright's understanding of transmission failure and his diagnosis of Moore's proof's failure, as well as of other arguments which seemingly exhibit the same kind of structure, such as McKinsey's argument against the compatibility between self-knowledge and semantic externalism, and Putnam's argument against the (epistemic) possibility that one might be a brain in the vat. Recently, however, reacting to Pryor's defence of dogmatism and his attendant diagnosis of Moore's proof's failure as due to a mere dialectical shortcoming, Davies has come to change his view on transmission failure as well. More precisely, he has urged that a second kind of failure of transmission of warrant should be countenanced.
Davies's new failure and its failure
Davies introduces his second notion of transmission failure in the context of a quite elaborate discussion of how he thinks the Wright-Pryor dispute should be understood. According to him, that dispute concerns the structure of propositional warrants for ordinary empirical beliefs, such as (I) "Here is a hand". Propositional warrants are those warrants there are for believing a particular proposition, independently of a subject's actual beliefs and, moreover, independently of how he conceives of those warrants. They must be contrasted both with doxastic warrants, viz. with those propositional warrants which attach or fail to attach to a subject's actual beliefs, and with those warrants a subject takes himself to have, given his collateral beliefs. 10 To illustrate: if one has a perception of a hand in front of one (and, depending on one's theory of perceptual warrant, there is also an independent warrant for (III)-that there is an external world), one would also have a propositional warrant for the belief "Here is a hand", even if one doesn't in fact form that belief. If, in contrast, one does form that belief, then one will have a doxastic warrant for it. Finally, a subject could mistakenly think that he has warrant only for "Here is a pinkish expanse", perhaps because of some other things he believes about the cause of his current experience, when in fact he has warrant for "Here is a hand", and form, accordingly, the former belief. Given his own belief about what warrants he has, however, it's perfectly rational for him to believe "Here is a pinkish expanse", even if, given the actual structure of those warrants, he should rather believe "Here is a hand".
As we have just seen, on Wright's view that warrant is afforded not just by one's current sense experience with the representational content as of a hand where one seems to see it, but also by the collateral assumption (III) that there is an external world, which, in turn, needs to be warranted, in order to be rationally held. As is by now familiar, Pryor denies this: he thinks that one's current sense experience, with its particular representational (and phenomenal) content, is enough to give one a-to be sure defeasible-warrant for (I), without the need of any prior warrant for (III), provided one has no (reason to) doubt about it. While, then, according to Wright, Moore's proof fails because of its patent circularity-because warrant for (III) is already needed to have the perceptual warrant for (I), which, via the entailment, would give one a warrant for (III), no charge of circularity can be sustained against it on Pryor's understanding of the structure of perceptual warrant. On his view, the proof fails simply because it is usually advanced against a sceptic, who, according to Pryor, thinks (III) is (likely to be) false. But, surely, if one thinks that (III) is (likely) false, one can't take one's current sense experience as a warrant for (I). Hence, when Moore's proof is presented against such an opponent, it will fail to convince him because, given his collateral beliefs about (III), he will be bound to think that the proof starts off with an unwarranted premise. Hence, on Pryor's view, the proof fails merely for dialectical reasons.
Roughly, Davies thinks that Pryor's notion of dialectical failure is in fact a second kind of failure of transmission of warrant. For, in his view, it is important to recognise that Pryor's allegedly dialectical failure actually occurs within a specific kind of epistemic project: one in which one is trying to "settle the question" as to whether there is an external world, against an opponent who thinks it is (likely) false there is. 11 In such a kind of project what is at issue is not the structure of propositional warrants, but, rather, which warrants, among propositional ones, one can appropriate, as it were, given one's own experiences and collateral beliefs.
If so, no matter whether the structure of propositional warrants is as Wright thinks it is, or as Pryor thinks of it, one's antecedent disbelief in (III) will make one's (putative) perceptual propositional warrant for (I) rationally unavailable. Hence, on Davies's view, one's collateral beliefs prevent the perceptual propositional warrant for (I) to be transmitted to (III). Now, is Davies's alleged second kind of transmission failure really a case of transmission failure? A moment reflection suffices to return a negative answer to this question. For, trivially, there seems to be no reason to deny that the perceptual propositional warrant does transmit (on Pryor's view of the matter), but remains rationally out of reach. The problem wouldn't be one of failure of transmission of a propositional perceptual warrant for (I), but, rather of the rational unavailability, 12 to the given doubting subject, of that warrant, in light of his collateral beliefs. To clarify: on Pryor's understanding of the structure of empirical warrants, one's experience as of a hand would give one a propositional warrant to believe (I) which would transmit to (III). Still, given one's collateral antecedent belief that it is (likely) false that there is an external world, one could not rationally take oneself to have that warrant. But, on the understanding of the notion of warrant according to which warrants are the rationally available ones, there would be no warrant for (I) in the first place. Hence, there could be no failure of transmission of warrant, for that presupposes the existence of a warrant for the premises which somehow cannot reach the conclusion of a logically 11 In contrast, the issue of the nature of propositional warrants for empirical beliefs such as (I) is seen by Davies as impinging on another kind of epistemic project, which he calls "deciding what to believe". I discuss the legitimacy of this kind of project in Coliva (2010) . 12 Pryor (2004a Pryor ( , 2004b too discusses the issue of the rational unavailability of warrant to a given subject. He calls it "rational obstruction", and in his Pryor (2011) "hypothetical undermining". valid argument that proceeds from them. So, whatever phenomenon Davies is trying to draw attention to, I suggest it has to be conceived of as something other than a kind of failure of transmission of warrant.
Another kind of failure
Despite the failure of Davies's second kind of failure, I do think nevertheless that there are other ways in which an argument can exhibit transmission failure and thus be epistemically circular and, for this reason, also question-begging. Here, I wish to canvass one such further kind of transmission failure, leaving it for further investigation whether there can be more.
To see this second kind of transmission failure, let us go back to Wright's (and early Davies's) kind of transmission failure. As we saw, the thought was that:
Thesis 1: a certain experience with a given representational (and phenomenal) content wouldn't be enough to give one a (defeasible) warrant for a specific empirical belief such as (I) "Here is a hand".
So, according to Wright (and early Davies),
Thesis 2: in order for that experience to be a warrant for (I), some extra information 13 is needed, in particular that there is an external world (with which one is causally interacting and which is mostly correctly revealed to one through sense experience).
However, according to Wright (and early Davies), Thesis 3: that information can rationally be assumed only if one has warrant for it.
The circularity, then, on Wright's (and early Davies's) account of the matter, depends on Thesis 3. For warrant for (III)-that there is an external world-would already be needed in order to have warrant for (I)-"Here is a hand". Hence, the perceptual warrant one would have for (I) could never give one a first warrant to believe (III). Therefore, Transmission-failure 1: An argument fails to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion if (and only if) warrant for the conclusion is already needed in order to have warrant for its premises in the first place.
I think, however, that already Thesis 2 would be enough to generate a-of course different-kind of transmission failure. The simple thought behind this claim is this: how could one acquire a warrant to believe a conclusion of an argument if the mere information contained in the conclusion were already needed in order for the warrant for the premises to exist at all, in the first place?
Let me make this idea more vivid by considering proofs in the mathematical case, which were also what originated Wright's ideas on transmission failure at the outset. As will become apparent, this analogy is not straightforward. Still, I think it may help to get our intuitions going. It is then beyond the scope of this essay to try and defend it in detail. Mathematical proofs-think for convenience of proofs in Euclidean geometry-are generated within mathematical theories and these, in turn, depend for their existence on certain axioms, i.e. on certain propositions which are assumed without proof. 14 Now, why can't axioms be proved, or can be proved only circularly? Clearly, because they are the primitive pieces of information on which any proof, given within that theory, depends. What this means is that they are needed to generate warrant for any other mathematical proposition within a given theory. Put in mathematical terms, axioms are needed in order to prove certain propositions which, once proved, count as that theory's theorems. So, the reason why axioms can't be proved within a mathematical theory is that they need already to be assumed to give any proof-hence to generate any kind of warrant-within the theory.
This therefore suggests that another way in which a failure of transmission of warrant may occur is as follows:
Transmission-failure 2: An argument fails to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion if (and only if) this very conclusion needs already to be assumed in order to have warrant for its premises in the first place.
The mathematical analogue of Transmission-failure 1 would, in contrast, be this: a given proposition can't be proved within a mathematical theory-and, therefore, it can't become a theorem of that theory-if proving it-that is, generating warrant for it-depended, at some stage, on having already warrant for it-that is to say, if it depended on its already being a theorem of the theory. 15 One might then suggest that the case of mathematical axioms is somehow spurious-in fact a degenerate case of Transmission-failure 1-for it is true that axioms can't be proved within the theory, still they are rationally assumed because we have a priori, independent warrant for them. Personally, I am sceptical of this view: I prefer to consider axioms in a mathematical theory as stipulations, which, as such, can't be independently warranted. True, once these stipulations have been made, one may think of having an a priori warrant to believe that, say, points (in Euclidean geometry) are indivisible or that parallel lines will never intersect. But even if we had such a priori warrant, it would come for free from a stipulation which, as such, cannot be warranted. Furthermore, if a priori warrants should somehow certify the truth of what is warranted thereby, the vexed issue of the status of Euclid's axiom five-according to which there is only one parallel line to another line r , which passes from point P-may make us suspicious of the fact that we could really have such a kind of warrant. So one may just as well as stick to the view that these axioms are stipulated and accepted without any kind of warrant and, as such, used to generate warrant for propositions which follow from them. If so, the attempt to prove them within the theory they constitute would give rise to Transmission-failure 2, for one would try to prove them by using propositions which are warranted only as long as those axioms are assumed without there being a warrant for them.
Moderates, Transmission-failure 2 and Moore
Leaving the mathematical case aside, I think that also reflections on the very nature of perceptual warrants should lead us to acknowledge Transmission-failure 2. Of course this is not the place to give an articulate defence of this view, 16 but I actually think that there is room to maintain an intermediate position between Wright's and Pryor's on that issue, which I shall label "moderate", as opposed to "conservative" and "liberal". On the one hand, one may agree with Wright that the mere having of an experience with a certain representational and phenomenal content is not enough to warrant the corresponding empirical belief (or indeed any empirical belief) (Thesis 1) and, in so doing, already disagree with Pryor's (too) liberal account. This is not the place to offer a detailed defence of this idea. Suffice it to remind the reader of the fact that it has already been forcefully argued, 17 also by means of the formal machinery afforded by Bayesian calculus, that one's current hand-like experience, just by itself, would actually raise the probability of sceptical hypotheses such as "I am currently dreaming of having a hand here". Hence, just by itself, that experience would not corroborate "Here is a hand" more than it corroborates "I am currently dreaming of having a hand here". If we think otherwise it's because we are at least implicitly already ruling out the sceptical hypothesis and positively relying on being interacting with physical objects rather than merely dreaming of them.
Still, one might think that it would suffice, in order to have a perceptual warrant for ordinary empirical beliefs such as "Here is a hand", based on one's current sense experience, merely to assume a certain piece of information, in particular, regarding the existence of an external world (Thesis 2), with no need of having any further kind of warrant for it (Thesis 3). One may be so inclined if reflection on the ways of allegedly providing warrant for, in particular, the presupposition that there is an external world led one to disagree with liberals that evidential warrant for it could be provided by running something like Moore's proof, 18 as well as to disagree with 16 I have done so in Coliva (2011a,b) .
17 White (2006) and Wright (2007) . Similar views have been maintained in Coliva (2011a) and Wedgwood (2012) . 18 As already remarked in the main text, the occurrence of a hand-like experience would actually increase the probability of propositions such as "I am presently dreaming of having a hand". The fact we don't take it that way depends on already assuming of being interacting with a world populated by physical objects, containing hands in it. This would be a problem for the liberal position which applied Moore's argument in order to acquire warrant for such a conclusion on the assumption-which is central to dogmatism-that one could be open-minded with respect to such a proposition and yet acquire warrant for it just by having a certain course of experience. (Notice that if the open-minded assumption weren't in place, then the liberal Wright's (and Davies's) idea that there could be an unearned, non-evidential warrant for it; 19 or indeed with Ralph Wedgwood's recent attempt to provide a genuinely a priori warrant for it. 20 So, to visualise the proposal:
Conservatives on the nature of perceptual warrant Liberals on the nature of perceptual warrant
Moderates on the nature of perceptual warrant
Clearly all sorts of issues open up at this stage and I won't try to settle them here. For instance, one may wonder what it means to assume that there is an external world in this context: whether it would need to be a psychological attitude actually instantiated by all subjects engaging in the practice, or whether it should be thought of differently. Moreover, one may wonder whether it would consist in assuming the robust truth of that very assumption-somehow in a realist spirit-or simply in being committed to it, with no further assumption about its actual obtaining-in a much more anti-realist fashion. Another set of questions that would arise by taking the moderate view in connection with sceptical worries would concern the rationality of such an assumption: one might ask how one could rationally assume a given piece of information, unless one had (some kind of epistemic) warrant for it. All sorts of answers would be open here: from a form of naturalism which claims that this is something we simply do, given our actual practice of giving, asking for and assessing perceptual warrants for ordinary empirical beliefs, that need not be answerable to warrants and reasons; to a form of pragmatism, according to which this is something we assume only practically rationally-because it proves useful, given that it grounds that practice of ours-but which need not be supported by epistemic reasons; up to a new form of epistemic rationalism. Accordingly, if an assumption is a necessary precondition for having a practice which is in turn constitutive of epistemic rationality, it is epistemically rationally mandated and hence rational by the lights of epistemic rationality itself, even if it is not supported by warrants, let them be evidential or otherwise. My preferences, on which I can't possibly expound here, 21 go to constructing assumptions very thinly from a psychological point of view, so that one can be said to assume P if one is taking part in a practice which has that assumption as its rational precondition, no matter whether one is actually entertaining that assumption, let alone have the conceptual resources necessary to entertain it. I also hold that assuming P Footnote 18 continued view would collapse onto the moderate position I am advocating). The difficulties raised for Mooreanism by the Bayesian argument have been exposed by White (2006) , Silins (2007) and Wedgwood (2012) . 19 Here I can only state what I have argued for at length in Coliva (2011a) : that to explain for instance in Wright (2004) way why it would be rational to assume that there is an external world is not yet to produce, or to unravel a first-order warrant for such a presupposition. 20 Wedgwood (2012). consists in being committed to it, and in acting accordingly, while P might not be true. Furthermore, I defend the view that those assumptions, which are necessary to have the practice of producing and assessing warrants for empirical beliefs, are constitutive of our notion of epistemic rationality and, for that reason, are epistemically rationally mandated in their turn, without having to embrace Wright's (and new Davies's 22 ) notion of entitlements. 23 As said, the point of the present discussion is not to defend a particular version of the moderate position-a task the previous sketchy remarks obviously fall short of. Rather, it is to see how the moderate position would square-not surprisingly, I should add-with a lot of proposals already present in the debate on the nature of perceptual warrant: from naturalism and pragmatism, up to one brand of epistemic rationalism. Positions, that is, which, on the one hand, allow that one's current sense experience per se isn't enough to give one a warrant for ordinary empirical beliefs, because they recognise the force of the fact that experiences as such need not necessarily manifest their likely causes, and, in particular, material objects; and which, on the other, buy into the idea that epistemic warrants for very fundamental assumptions such as the existence of an external world can't be provided-not even in the form of entitlements-and propose different recipes about how to live with the consequences of that thought.
Let me also stress an important feature of moderatism-viz. its being a thesis about the structure of ordinary empirical warrants, based on one's perceptual experience. In particular, it is important to bear in mind that moderatism holds that such a kind of warrant is constituted by having a certain experience, while lacking defeaters, together with the assumption that there is an external world and possibly of further very general propositions such as "I am not the victim of a lucid and sustained dream" and "My sense organs are generally working reliably". To put it differently: moderatism gives you a recipe about what "ingredients" are needed in order to have ordinary perceptual warrants. Hence, the propositions assumed must be extremely general ones and the role of their assumption is, once more, that of making perceptual warrants possible in general. This excludes both the possibility that moderatism should traffic in specific propositions, for the role of collateral assumptions; or else that assuming them should only play a contingent role in forming a specific empirical warrant. 24 It is important to realise why moderate positions about the nature of perceptual warrant ought to return a negative verdict on Moore's proof as an attempt to provide warrant for our belief in the existence of an external world. All moderates would say that the conclusion of that argument-that there is an external world-must already be assumed in order to have a perceptual defeasible warrant for (I)-"Here is a hand"-in 22 Davies (2004) defends the notion of "negative" entitlements. 23 This, in turn, has also some antisceptical consequences for it shows that a sceptic who appeals to the notion of epistemic rationality to claim that we are not within our (epistemic) rights in holding the most basic presuppositions of our belief system is in fact making use of a notion of epistemic rationality which requires the acceptance of those presuppositions. Hence, on the one hand, the fact that they are accepted without warrant doesn't prevent them from giving rise to warranted beliefs once one has a certain course of experience as well. On the other, these assumptions, though unwarranted, aren't optional and revisable, for they are kept fixed by our actual and usual practice of producing, assessing and withdrawing from empirical warrants on the basis of perceptual evidence. I develop these ideas in Coliva (2011a,b) . 24 As we shall see in §6, these caveats may play a role in defusing possible counterexamples. the first place. However, if perceptual warrant depends for its existence on assuming (III), then an argument which, proceeding from that warrant, aimed at warranting (III) itself, would in fact presuppose the very piece of information it was supposed to provide warrant for. Hence, an argument such as Moore's would exhibit Transmission-failure 2. Accordingly, it could not produce a warrant for its conclusion.
To help clarify this point, consider that it is the assumption of the conclusion, which allows one to enter the first premise of Moore's proof, so that, in effect, the structure of that proof would be akin to
Hence, if arguments such as moore were cogent, they would display a very peculiar form of bootstrapping, as warrants available only thanks to certain assumptions would straightforwardly produce warrants for those very assumptions. But it doesn't seem plausible that these arguments give epistemic support to their conclusions. Of course perceptual warrants speak to the likely truth of propositions such as (I), yet they don't seem capable of changing the epistemic status of those assumptions (III) on which they depend. In particular, they don't seem capable of turning them into more likely truths. So, it seems to me that moderates had better allow for Transmission-failure 2 and connectedly return a negative verdict on the cogency of arguments such as moore. 25 25 For an attempt to maintain the opposite, see Ferrari and Orlandelli (2010, ms Wedgwood (2012), following Silins (2007) , tries to defend a liberal, non-Moorean account. The view, however, seems to me unstable. For, if it endorses liberalisms about perceptual warrants and Closure holds, it collapses into Mooreanism. Alternatively, if it holds that Moore's proof fails because one's hand-like experience as such can't actually warrant (III), it will have to abandon either liberalism, or Closure. For that result can only be due either to the fact that reliance on (the warrantedness of) (III) is needed, albeit implicitly (cf. §1), to have warrant for (I); or else on a denial of Closure. Since Wedgwood doesn't seem disposed to endorse the latter option, he can only maintain the former, and actually side with conservatives or with moderates. Since he doesn't consider moderates, he will have to side with conservatives. My impression is that both Wedgwood and Silins think that the liberal view can be defended, while Mooreanism rejected, because they conflate the issue of the existence and nature of propositional warrants for (I), with the issue of the availability to the thinking subject of collateral warrants for (III). I can't possibly expound on this problem here. I do so in Coliva (2012) . Notice, moreover, that there could be conservatives who are Mooreans if Mooreanism were understood disjunctively: either Moore's proof provides one with a first warrant for its conclusion; or it at least enhances a pre-existing one. Hence, a Moorean conservative could hold that while the proof is unable to provide one with a first warrant to believe it, it can at least corroborate one's previous pre-existing warrant for it, provided there is one (perhaps in the form of Wright's entitlements). For a problem for such a position, see footnote 30.
Furthermore, if one reflects on the fact that "warrant" is here conceived of in an internalist fashion, as something to which one could (at least in principle) appeal to redeem or claim the rationality of holding a certain belief, the kind of circularity involved would become even clearer. For, if asked to claim our warrant for (III), we would end up saying that assuming there is an external world, one is entitled to take one's sense experience as of a hand as a (defeasible) warrant for (I), and that, via the entailment and holding Closure, that gives one a warrant for (III). But the obvious question to ask, at that stage, would be with what right one can assume (III). This, however, isn't a question that Moore's proof itself can answer, for, on this view, that proof can be run only if that assumption is already made. That is why, I think, Moore's proof would prove, once more, unable to provide a first warrant to claim that accepting (III) is the rational thing to do. For one could claim warrant for (I), and hence for (III), only by being already warranted in claiming that assuming (III) is rationally legitimate. 26 If all this is correct, we can see that, in general, in order for a proof to be cogent-no matter in which domain it is propounded-it must be the case that warrant for its premise(s) neither depends for its very existence on the warrantedness of the conclusion (Transmission-failure 1), nor on the assumption of its conclusion as such (Transmission-failure 2).
6 Transmission-failure 1 and 2 and the Closure Principle I now want to address two further issues. The first one concerns the relationship between Transmission-failure 1 and Transmission-failure 2; whereas the second is connected with the relationship of both-but, in particular, of Transmission-failure 2-with the Closure Principle.
As to the former, I don't think Transmission-failure 1 and 2 are incompatible. To see this, consider that it is a simple consequence of our definition that, whenever no independent warrant for the conclusion of an argument can be provided and to assume such a conclusion is nevertheless necessary for a certain body of information to warrant its premises, Transmission-failure 2 occurs. In contrast, if independent warrant for the conclusion can be acquired (and to assume the warrantedness of that conclusion is necessary in order for a certain body of information to warrant the premises), Transmission-failure 1 takes place.
So, for instance, I think zebra
(I) Here's a zebra (II) If this is a zebra, this isn't a cleverly disguised mule ------------------(III) This isn't a cleverly disguised mule
is an example of Transmission-failure 1, while I don't think Moore's proof is. For we can get independent warrant for "This is not a cleverly disguised mule"-independent, that is, of the specific sensory experience which gives us warrant for (I), which should then transmit to (III) via zebra. For instance, we could run a DNA test which would exclude that the animal in front of us is a mule in disguise, even though it didn't yet tell us whether it is a zebra. 27 If we then assume that such a warranted piece of information is what allows one to have warrant for "Here's a zebra", given one's zebra-like experience, then zebra would display Transmission-failure 1. That is to say, zebra couldn't provide one with a first warrant to believe its conclusion.
In contrast, I think we cannot get an independent warrant for "There is an external world". As said, I think there is no prospect to do so in a satisfactory way because that would commit us to-in my view-quite implausible positions: either the liberal Moorean view; or a traditional conservative view, according to which there should be a priori warrant for propositions such as "There is an external world"; or else, to Wright's position that countenances non evidential warrants-entitlements-for such a presupposition. In general, therefore, what is to be expected is that Transmission-failure 2 will occur whenever putative arguments designed to confer warrant on so-called "heavy-weight assumptions" are put forward. 28 That is to say, Transmission-failure 2 affects those arguments which proceed from a premise warranted on the basis of one's everyday experience, that entails a conclusion about, for instance (beside the existence of an external world), the fact that our sense organs are mostly working reliably, that one is not now dreaming, that there are other minds, that there is a past, and that there are uniformities of nature. 29 Characteristically, in all these cases the conclusion of the argument must already be assumed in order to have warrant for its premises in the first place. It remains for further investigation whether other kinds of argument could exhibit Transmission-failure 2 beside the ones just mentioned. In other cases, where independent warrant for a conclusion entailed by a logically valid argument (and needed in order to have warrant for the premises in the first place) can 27 Of course the story is a little bit more complicated than that for one may hold that the DNA test gives one warrant for (III) (in zebra) only by courtesy of one's experience while reading the results of the test, for instance, and that will introduce further assumptions, which may ultimately involve "There is an external world". For present purposes, we may ignore this complication, because even if ultimately the warrant for (III) in zebra may depend on further arguments involving such an assumption, the specific argument arranged to provide warrant for it, would not. 28 Although the term "heavy weight assumption" is due to Dretske (2005) , I am here using it in such a way as to refer to very general assumptions like "There is an external world" (as well as "I am not the victim of a lucid and sustained dream", "My sense organs are mostly working reliably", etc), which may well not be the only propositions Dretske would countenance among his "heavy-weight assumptions". 29 Consider the following argument for the existence of other minds. I see someone moaning and crying, while bleeding, so I reason as follows: "Here is a person who is in pain; if there is a person in pain here then other minds exist; therefore, other minds exist". It seems that in order to have a warrant for the first premise it isn't enough merely to take my experience at face value and that assumption of the conclusion be needed as well. If Transmission-failure 2 holds, however, by running that argument I would not acquire any warrant to believe its conclusion. I think similar considerations might hold for Moore-style arguments purportedly designed to confer warrant to propositions such as "The Earth has existed for a very long time" or "People are generally reliable". A closer examination of these possible extensions will, however, have to be deferred to another occasion. be attained, I am happy to grant that the diagnosis of the problem will have to appeal to Transmission-failure 1.
Let us now turn to the relationship between our two kinds of transmission failure and the Principle of closure under known entailment for epistemic operators, such as warrant. Consider zebra (I) Here's a zebra (II) If this is a zebra, this isn't a cleverly disguised mule -----------------(III) This isn't a cleverly disguised mule If we take supporters of Transmission-failure 1 to be saying that that argument cannot provide a first warrant to believe its conclusion because in order to have warrant for (I) (III) must already be warranted in the first place, given that (III) can be independently warranted, the Closure Principle for warrant does hold.
Similarly, for those who are happy with entitlements (or indeed with a priori warrants for (III)), it may be argued that one may have a non-evidential warrant for "There is an external world" (or an a priori one) and that that suffices-together with a handlike experience-to give one a (defeasible) warrant for (I)-"Here is a hand". So, Closure for warrant will hold in this case too. 30 But what about the relationship between Transmission-failure 2 and the Closure Principle? On that view, things look worse for Closure. For it is denied that assumptions such as (III)-that there is an external world-are in any way independently warrantable and, moreover, it is a tenet of the moderate position-spelled out along the lines presented so far-that one could not acquire a warrant for them by running a valid argument which proceeds from premises that, once those assumptions are made (and one has a hand-like experience as well), are warranted.
I actually believe that the failure of Closure for warrant is indeed a consequence of embracing Transmission-failure 2 and of the fact that the conclusion of a given argument can't independently be warranted. Yet this is a consequence one could live with, I think, because of the limited number of cases in which one should favour the moderate conception of warrant (for independent reasons) and thus allow for Transmission-failure 2. 31 Connectedly, we can now see that while zebra exhibits Transmission-failure 1, but no failure of Closure, Moore's proof exhibits Transmission-failure 2 and therefore a failure of Closure. So, it appears that we have reached an explanation of why Closure (for warrant) must fail, and must do so only in certain cases. That is, in all and only those cases where the assumption of the conclusion is necessary in order to 30 It is then an open issue whether, given Closure, one could also acquire a second, as it were, ordinary evidential warrant for (III) via the entailment. Of course this is disputable because it may lead to the "alchemical" result of producing an ordinary warrant out of an entitlement. A supporter of entitlements concerned with avoiding "alchemy" may argue that closure for warrant-that is for evidential warrant-fails in Moore's proof case, while it holds for entitlements, i.e. for non-evidential warrants. 31 However, it is worth-noticing that, as we shall see, on my view these assumptions are epistemically rationally mandated, although they are neither warranted nor warrantable (either evidentially or by means of non-evidential warrants such as entitlements, or indeed of a priori ones). One could then suggest that what would transmit is at least rational mandate.
have warrant for the premises and the conclusion can't be warranted, evidentially or otherwise.
This-I think-is an important result for, as connoisseurs of Dretske's work will know, it is often unclear why Closure for warrant should fail. Indeed the motivation offered 32 seems to depend on a conflation between failure of transmission-of kind 1, in fact-and failure of Closure. Wright, however, has long been concerned to show that Transmission-failure1 and failure of Closure for epistemic warrant are two different phenomena and that the former doesn't entail the latter. But we can now see that there is something to Dretske's intuition too. For failure of Closure is indeed entailed by Transmission-failure, but by Transmission-failure 2, not 1.
Finally, I think this is a result we can actually live with because Closure would fail only in a very limited amount of cases and for principled reasons. So, I take it, it doesn't have the disastrous consequences, regarding the cogency and epistemic utility of most of our inferences, often denounced by those who have been concerned to defend Closure at all costs. 33 Furthermore, I think it is indeed a consequence of a view about the architecture of empirical warrants, once construed at its best, that seems to me far more plausible than its rivals.
We can thus summarize as follows the outcome of our discussion so far.
(W = evidential warrant; W* = either a priori or non-evidential warrant, depending on one's variety of conservatism and whether or not one retains Closure for W (see footnote 30)).
A possible counterexample: Pryor's (?) failure to see this failure
Pryor 34 accepts Transmission-failure 1. Indeed, he allows that zebra is an example of it. 35 He also accepts the principle of Closure. However, as is well-known, he maintains that Moore's proof is not an example of transmission failure, because, on his view, one need not have any antecedent warrant for the conclusion of that argument-that there is an external world-in order to have a (of course defeasible) perceptual warrant for its premise, given one's current sense experience as of a hand, and that lack of doubt 32 For instance in Dretske (2005) .
33 This is the same conclusion recently reached, in independent ways, by Avnur (2011) .
34 Pryor (2000 Pryor ( , 2004a Pryor ( ,b, 2011 .
35 "I agree that transmission-failure is a genuine phenomenon, and worth close study. And I agree that the ZEBRA-argument is a good example of it" (Pryor 2004b, p. 4). suffices to that end. For, in effect, he actually denies Thesis 1, at least for what he considers "perceptually basic" empirical beliefs. 36 What I wish to inquire further is Pryor's recent denial of the reality of the phenomenon that I have called Transmission-Failure 2, which occurs in the context of a complex discussion of "When warrant transmits"-as his title reads. 37 The purpose of the discussion is to show that there are only two contenders at play: liberals and conservatives. Moderates-not evidently called as such by Pryor, who merely think that assuming (III) is needed to have a perceptual warrant for (I) in the first place, and that this would suffice to bring about a second kind of transmission failure, have no place in town. 38 Pryor actually discusses two possible positions which would claim that Moore's proof exhibits a kind of transmission failure other than Transmission-failure 1. He calls them the "warrant-making factor model" and the "anti-underminer model", respectively. Accordingly, "if B is among the factors that make W be a warrant for A, then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to the claim that B obtains"; and "if B is an anti-underminer for W, then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to B". According to Pryor, an anti-underminer hypothesis is one which is not an underminer for one's warrant for A and that entails the falsity of some undermining hypothesis for one's warrant for A. So, for instance, "There is an external world that I am consciously perceiving right now" is an anti-underminer hypothesis for one's perceptual warrant for "Here is a hand", for it undermines the hypothesis that one might be dreaming right now, say, which, in its turn, would be an underminer of one's perceptual warrant for "Here is a hand". Now, I take it that the model that is more closely related to the moderate position and to the second kind of transmission-failure I'm advocating is the second, while I think the first one would tally better with, presumably, some externalist views. For on some of those positions it is claimed that since there is an external world, then one's current sense experience as of a hand gives one a defeasible warrant for an empirical belief such as "Here is a hand". So the obtaining of (III) is what makes one's warrant for (I) possible in the first place (and it would be a further question whether such a warrant could or couldn't transmit to the conclusion of the argument 39 ). That Pryor's discussion is going to engage with moderatism and Transmission-failure 2 seems further supported by his claim that the two models reflect "notions of 'taking for granted' or 'presupposing' that we already [have] an intuitive grasp of"-I would say: one more externalist/realist in spirit and another one of a more internalist/antirealist fashion-; and that "it can seem natural to doubt whether 36 We shall waive here any worry about whether there is such a class of empirical beliefs, or about how to individuate them. 37 Pryor (2011) . 38 Pryor (2011, §7) . 39 In his very early writings on the topic Davies seemed attracted to this view which, however, differs from what he later came to accept as transmission failure, i.e. Transmission-failure 1. This is not the place to rehearse Davies's views, although in the interest of completeness it might be useful to check whether, after all, and contrary to Wright's and Davies's own later opinion, it could really count as a case of transmission failure.
arguments can establish their own 'presuppositions' [since] that can seem like a covert form of question-begging". 40 Be that as it may, 41 in what follows I wish merely to draw on one of Pryor's problem cases in order to consider a possible counterexample to my view. For, in effect, he presents a little argument where, according to him, moderates should say that warrant does not transmit-that Transmission-failure 2 occurs, because assuming the conclusion is necessary in order to have warrant for the premises-but where, intuitively, warrant does transmit from the premises to the conclusion. This, in turn, would refute moderates, at least insofar as they maintain a second notion of transmission failure (but notice that it would then be a further issue whether they would also be mistaken with respect to their conception of the architecture of empirical warrants 42 ). Here it is:
RAT A guy working at a zoo says that he has just given all animals a potion which makes them invisible and so he says "All the animals in the pen are invisible". His friend rebuts him with the following argument: (1) [Occurrence of an experience as of rats] (2) I see rats in the corner (3) There are some visible animals in the pen.
According to Pryor, a moderate should say that assuming (3) is needed in order to have warrant for (2). Hence, that that warrant can't transmit to (3), since that would be a case of Transmission-failure 2. Pryor, however, thinks it intuitive that warrant does transmit, although assuming (3) would be needed in order to have warrant for the premises in the first place. So, Rat would be a counterexample to, at least, Transmission-failure 2. 43 In response to Pryor, I see three possibilities for a supporter of the moderate position and of Transmission-failure 2. The first one is to acknowledge that (3) needs to be assumed in order to have warrant for (2). This could be motivated by saying that in light of the previous information coming from the zoo guy that he has given all animals 40 Pryor (2011, p. 29) . 41 Actually it might be a more complicated than that because on the moderate position, as I have characterized it, though the obtaining of (III) is not a constitutive element of one's perceptual warrant for (I), the assumption of (III) is. So it might be that moderatism as I think of it falls in between Pryor's two notions. 42 Let me add that divorcing the moderate view from Transmission-failure 2 seems to me to pre-empt the motivation for the former view. For it would then be possible to earn warrant for the conclusion of an argument even if assuming that very conclusion were needed in order to have warrant for its premises in the first place. Furthermore, it would involve one in what seems to me a very overt form of question beggingness, viz. the one I represented in the main text as
[Q] P P Q Q Still such a position is part of the logical space in this area (see Ferrari and Orlandelli (2010, ms) as a possible development of a moderate Moorean position, already included in footnote 25). In what follows, I will ignore this possibility and will thus take Transmission-failure 2 to be entailed by the moderate view. 43 (though not necessarily to the moderate view). See previous footnote. a potion that makes them invisible, one's visual experience as of rats is neither here nor there. After all, on the basis of that information, one could actually take one's current visual experience as a sign of one's being hallucinating rats or whatever, maybe because of high temperature, or of some poisoned food one might have ingested and so on. So one needs to assume (3) in order to have an underminer for what would otherwise undermine one's perceptual warrant, viz. the information that all animals have been given a potion which makes them invisible. If so, however, a friend of Transmission-failure 2 should say that Rat fails to transmit warrant precisely because of Transmission-failure 2. Furthermore, the impression-which I personally find it difficult to share-that it may seem intuitive that Rat doesn't exhibit any kind of transmission failure could be explained by saying that it would depend on assuming (3) first, and on then implicitly reverting to the liberal conception of the architecture of warrant. For the assumption of (3) undermines the information coming from the zoo guy, while the liberal construction of warrant allows one to have an immediate perceptual warrant for (2), which would then transmit to (3). But, of course, one would need to share Pryor's sympathy for the liberal construction of warrant in order to find this view plausible-a sympathy that moderates obviously don't share.
The second possibility open to a supporter of the moderate view and of Transmission-failure 2, which I personally favour, is to deny that (3) needs to be assumed in order to have warrant for (2). One could in fact suggest that, as we saw in the previous sections, the kind of presuppositions which make perceptual warrant for ordinary empirical beliefs possible are very general ones, such as that there is an external world, that one's sense organs are usually working reliably, that one is not victim of a lucid and sustained dream, or suffering from forms of gross sense deception. They can't be as specific as (3)-that there are some visible animals where one is looking-for, in that way, it would never be legitimate to use one's current sense experience to acquire warrant that, through valid inference and holding Closure, would give one warrant for propositions entailed by the ones for which one is perceptually warranted. On this reading, Rat would not constitute a counterexample to Transmission-failure 2, simply because it wouldn't meet the conditions for the moderate position in the first place.
Finally, another possibility is to say that Rat exhibits Transmission-failure 1. For independent (of one's current sense experience) warrant for "There are some visible animals in the pen" can be acquired and warrant for (3) seems to be a necessary piece of information in order to take one's current sense experience as warrant for (2), given the further information coming from the zoo guy that he has given all animals that particular potion. Hence, Rat would fulfil the conditions for Transmission-failure 1, but not those for Transmission-failure 2 and would obviously not be a counterexample to the latter.
So, once the details of Rat are spelled out, at least in the three directions I could think of, it seems that it wouldn't constitute a problem for the idea that there can be a second kind of transmission failure, which, in the case of perceptual warrants, would pair with a moderate conception of their structure, alternative both to Wright's conservative view and to Pryor's liberal one. No doubt the possibility of counterexamples deserves further investigation, but so-I think-does the notion of Transmission-failure 2 with its attendant moderate conception of empirical warrants.
